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vs. 
Karla v. Moyer, Mother of 
the deceased and Appellant. 
CASE NO. 15469 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Summary Judgment and Order directing disinterment 
and cremation of the body of the deceased THOMAS MILTON MOYER over the 
objection of his mother, Kar la V. Moyer, herein the Appellant. The 
Summary Judgment and Order was entered by the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable David B. Dee 
presiding. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the estate of 
THOMAS MIL TON MOYER, Deceased 
vs 
Karla V. Moyer, Mother of 
the deceased and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
CASE NO. 15469 
This an appeal from the Summary Judgment and Order directing 
disinterment and the cremation of the body of the deceased Thomas 
Milton Moyer over the objection of the mother of the deceased, Mrs. 
Karla V. Moyer. The Summary Judgment and Order was entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Honorable David B. Dee presiding. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
The appellant Karla V. Moyer appeals from the Order of the Court 
directing the disinterment and cremation of the body of her son Th 
' omas 
Mil ton Moyer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Joseph Smart filed a petition for appointment as ancillary re-
presentative of the estate of Thomas Mil ton Moyer, deceased. Petitioner 
Joseph Smart sought to have the Order of an Arizona Probate Court enforced 
in order to have the body of Thomas Moyer disinterred from its grave in 
Utah to thereafter be cremated and the ashes sent to Arizona to a Mr. 
Raymond Landry a close friend of the deceased and the executor under the 
purported will. Appellant Karla Moyer is the mother of the deceased 
Thomas Moyer. She appeared in the Lower Court with her lawyer, Mr. J. 
Douglas Kinateder and objected to the appointment of Joseph Smart as 
ancillary administrator and to his petition. Petitioner Smart filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Honorable David B. Dee heard oral argu-
ment on Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Judge Dee asked Counsel 1 
for Karla Moyer if he would like to make an oral motion to dismiss t~ 
petition to be considered with the Motion for Summary Judgment and coun-
sel replied in the affirmative. Counsel for Petitioner did not object to , 
i 
the motion to dismiss being heard at the same hearing. Judge Dee told boti, I 
counsel that he would take both motions under advisement. Approximately 0 
week later, on September 29th, the 1977 Judge Dee granted the Motion for 
Summary Judgment of the Petitioner, Joseph Smart and ordered the body 
disinterred and cremated and delivered to the executor of the estate Rayni:r 
Landry. Subsequently a stay in proceedings was obtained pending this a~ 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests a reversal of the Lower Court's 
decision. The Court erred in not granting Appellant's oral motion to dis-
miss the petition of Joseph Smart. Appellant requests the above Utah 
Supreme Court to direct the Lower Court to dismiss the said petition of 
Joseph Smart with prejudice. In the alternative appellant requests that 
she be permitted to have a trial on the merits to prove whether the 
executor of the estate, and thereby the ancillary representative, consented 
to the burial of the decedent the executor and administrative thereby waiv-
ing any rights to carry out disinterment and cremation under the will. 
-2-
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1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Thomas Moyer was a single adult middle-aged male who 
resided 
in Phoenix with Mr. Raymond Landry who became the executor of the purported 
will of Mr. Moyer. The relationship of the two men is not very clear in the I 
record however the two had been close personal friends for a while. Mr. 
Landry claims the two were also monks in St. Jude's Monastary of the Old 
Catholic Church in Phoenix. 
The will is purported to have been signed by the decedent on the 
ll th of December, 1977. Two weeks later Thomas Moyer came to Salt Lake 
with his companion Raymond Landry to be with Moyer's family during the 
Christmas Holidays. On Christmas day Mr. Moyer suffered a fatal heart 
attack and died within a few hours. The family's version of the events 
which followed is referred to in the affadavits of Karla Moyer, the mother 
and appellant, and a sister of the deceased, Louise Jaeger. According to 
this version, after the family and Mr. Landry had recovered somewhat hoo 
the shock of Mr. Moyer's death either the same Christmas day or the day 
after, Mr. Landry produced a will and pointed out the language of the will 
I 
referring to the cremation of the body. Landry stated however, that he woul; [ 
go along with the family. In her affadavit appellant Karla Moyer refers to I 
a compromise between family members and Mr. Landry to the effect that Mr. 
Landry would permit the burial conditioned upon the family permitting 




Church. The mother was a member of the L. D. S. Church and would have prefer I 
red not to have her son buried in the ceremonial robes of another church but 
-3-
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she kept her part of the agreement which was part of the compromise. 
After the burial the family was at peace until the Arizona probate pro-
ceedings were started in April some four months later. These ancillary 
proceedings were brought in Utah in August of 1977, almost eight months 
after Mrs. Moyer's son was buried. It is the firm contention of the 
appellant, Kar la Moyer and Louise Jaeger that al though Mr. Landry ob-
jected once on the day of the burial Mr. Landry gave his full support 
and consent to the burial of the deceased once the compromise had been 
reached and that upon reliance. of this consent they laid their departed 
son and brother's body to rest. 
- 4--
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REMAINS OF THE DECEASED BELONG TO HIS FAMILY AND 
THE BODY WAS NOT PART OF THE ESTATE. 
At early common law no rights of property in a corpse were re-
cognized. For a general discussion of the subject see 7ALR 3d p 747 a~ 
54 ALR 3d 1037. There appear to be no Utah cases on the point so it can 
be assumed that Utah has not by case nor by statute modified the common 
law rule. The Honorable David B. Dee in his Memorandum Decision in t~ 
Lower Court referred to 26-26-1 Utah Code Ann. (1953) or the Anatomi~l 
Gift Act yet that statute exists for the limited purpose of enabling one 
to donate parts of his or her body for medical or humanitarian reasons. 
Thus section 26-26-2 limits the class of donees to (a) a licensed physi-
cian or surgeon, ( b) a hospital, ( c) a medical school, college or uni ver-
sity engaged in medical education and research, ( d) blood banks and (e) 
certain other physicians. Section 26-26-8 states the act was intended 
for medical, humanitarian, and scientific purposes. 
In Enos V. Snyder, ( 1900) 131 Cal 68, 63 P 170, the California 
Supreme Court held that the corpse of the testator was not part of the 
estate and that the directions in the will were of no effect and the Court 
held that the family of the decedent, and not his executrix, was entitled 
to the body, despite the express wishes of the will. A subsequent Call-
h l E V S d dl. d undercut the fornia case, t ough it did not overru e nos. . ny er, 
h t t t In Re Henders_on's doctrine that t e corpse was no testamen ary proper y. -
Estate 13 Cal App 2d 449, 57 P2d 212, ( 1936) where the deceased had createo . 
-5-
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an expensive trust for a mausoleum desiring that she be interred in the 
mausoleum and that her son, husband, father and mother be disinterred from 
another plot of ground to be reinterred with her, the Court said in effect 
that each case must be decided on its merits and that the trial court erred 
in taking the dicta of Enos V. Snyder so literally. The review court re-
versed ordering the deceased to be interred in the mausoleum and the son 
and husband reinterred. As to the reinterment of the father and mother of 
the deceased the Court ordered a new trial to determine that issue. The 
Supreme Court stated that as between a suit among relatives the doctrine 
of Enos V. Snyder was not a sweeping prohibition against the enforcement 
of the testator's expressed wishes. The Court stressed examining each 
case in light of its particular circumstances. 
. . . . it is now held universally in this country that 
whenever a dispute arises as to the manner or place of 
burial of a body as between relatives of the deceased 
as expressed by him in his will or otherwise, there is 
presented a proper subject for judicial determination, 
which will be decided by the courts on the merits in 
accordance with the principles of equity and such con-
sideration of propriety and justice as arise out of the 
particular circumstances of each case. 
In Re Henderson's Estate 
57 P2d 212, at 214. (emphasis added) 
POINT II 
THE ANCILLARY REPRESENTATIVE AND THE EXECUTOR ARE BOTH 
ESTOPPED FROM DISINTERRING THE REMAIMS OF THE DECEASED 
BECAUSE THE EXECUTOR CONSENTED TO AND PARTICIPATED IN 
THE BURIAL AND IT WOULD BE UNCONSCIONABLE TO DISINTERR 
THE REMAINS AFTER THE EXECUTOR AND THE ANCIALLARY 
DELAYED SO LONG. 
Great discretion was permitted the Executor under the purported 
•ill. The Executor was permitted to dispose of any of the personal effects 
-6-
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of the deceased among the relatives. Though the request was intend d 
e to 
be in writing, still the spirit or intention of the deceased accordi~ ~ 
the will was to give broad discretion to the Executor pertaining to the 
desires of family members. Appellant argues that if the Courts may 
construe a corpse to be property and therefore disposable through a will 
then such "property" is a personal effect left to the discretion of the 
Executor according to the will. Appellant argues that the Executor 
exercised his discretion when he consented to the burial of the deceased 
by the family. However, regardless as to whether the Executor had t~ 
discretion according to the will he and his assignees of the action should 
be estopped from prosecuting this action where he gave his consent to t~ 
burial, and, appellant believes at least she is entitled to a trial on 
the merits as to whether the Executor did give his consent where he now 
announces that he did not consent. The fam!ly laid their son and brother 
to rest and they are now entitled to be protected from having the body d~ 
up, cremated and then sent to lie in a jar in St. Jude's Monastary. 
In Guerin V. Cassidy, 38 N. J. Super 454, 119 A2d 780, 7ALR ~ 
747, the court in also holding that the body was not part of the est~e 
also stressed the fact that the body had already been interred in conse-
crated ground. This is another way of saying that after months of inter-
ment bodies should be left at rest and families be permitted their peace. 
-7-
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Summary Judgment and 
Order of the Lower Court be reversed and that an order be entered restrain-
ing the petitioner from removing or in any way disturbing the remains of 
the deceased Thomas Milton Moyer. In the alternative Appellant requests 
that she be permitted to present to a trial court evidence that the 
Executor Raymond Landry did knowingly give his full approval and consent 
to the burial of the deceased by his family and why after these many months 
since the burial it would be unconscionable and inequitable to disinter the 
body of Appellant's son. 
Dated this 26th of November, 1977. 
/f'''"'/7~ 1~~ Do as Kinateder 
Attor y for Appellant 
I certify that I hand delivered two copies of this brief of 
Appellant to Mr. Brian Barnard, attorney for Respondent-Petitioner at 
214 East Fifth South, Salt Lake City, Utah on this 28th day of November, 
1977. 
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